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ABSTRACT 
 This research project explores causes and effects of the events that led to the 
repeated failed efforts to develop a Strategic Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
Capability. Multiple efforts to materialize the proposed capability development failed as 
they were initially outlined in the 1985 PSYOP Master Plan, in the 1990 revised PSYOP 
Master Plan, and in numerous subsequent research findings. Government officials 
recognized challenges from the changing geopolitical conditions and the importance of 
dominating the information domain but failed to promptly develop the capability needed 
to meet the new challenges. The renewed national security policies, which focused on the 
near-peer competition followed by countering violent extremist organizations, demanded 
the need to fill the missing capability gap, but the efforts to develop a strategic PSYOP 
capability stalled, which this thesis addresses. 
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I. BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIC 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITY 
This chapter introduces the concept of Strategic PSYOP Capability and presents 
advocating arguments for the capability development. It examines the current doctrinal 
definition of strategic PSYOP capability and accounts historical milestones of efforts to 
define the concept. 
It further explores the intricate nature of the strategic PSYOP capability by 
examining strategic effects of tactical and operational PSYOP capabilities. It explores the 
limits of strategic effects of other capabilities and establishes key characteristics that are 
unique to the strategic PSYOP capability. 
Finally, this chapter aims to establish a baseline assessment of the strategic PSYOP 
capability by identifying key characteristics to facilitate further investigation of the 
research question. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In 1983, two world superpowers were still vying for ideologically driven 
geopolitical dominance since the end of World War II. While maintaining their nuclear 
arsenals as key deterrence components, both the United States and the Soviet Union 
continued to grow their respective military spending to remain relevant in the arms race. 
President Ronald Reagan’s administration ramped up military expenditure under the 
Reagan Doctrine to militarily pressure the Soviets so they could be contained and 
eventually defeated. However, persistent Soviet propaganda and disinformation operations 
against the U.S. continued to undermine our foreign policy goals. 1  To counter the 
pervasive Soviet influence activities, the Reagan administration emphasized the 
                                                 
 1 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “No More Tactical Information Detachments: U.S. Military Psychological 
Operations in Transition,” in Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies, eds. Frank L. 
Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 17. 
2 
importance of the U.S. Psychological Operations capabilities to “support national security 
objectives in all legal and proper areas.”2 
With its emphasis on strategic application of all available information capabilities, 
several presidential mandates were issued to directly provide guidelines for the 
development of a strategic PSYOP capability. The 1985 PSYOP Master Plan outlined key 
proposals to meet the new defense capability requirement. The goal was to devise the 
strategic application of PSYOP capabilities at all levels of conflict, as well as during peace 
time. However, many questioned the proposals, and they were under the intense 
bureaucratic scrutiny driven by different interests, bargaining, ideas and beliefs of various 
stakeholders. Since then, several other significant efforts followed on every turn of the 
important geopolitical environment, but none materialized as they were originally 
envisioned in 1985. 
Today, nearly four decades later and after the initial recognition of the capability 
gap, conversation about strategic PSYOP capability development continues. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research project intends to identify and analyze factors that caused the long 
stalemate of the capability development process. However, before seeking an answer, I 
believe a deliberate process to establish the legitimacy of the subject in question is 
necessary. Because, without answering what is Strategic PSYOP Capability, and validating 
arguments for the need of such capability, efforts to find answers to the main question may 
be premature and incomplete. For this reason, this thesis is structured to answer several 
predetermined questions that lead to the findings that will serve to answer the last but the 
main question. The following questions are designed to provide answers for the initial 
prompt and validity. 
• What key characteristics define the strategic PSYOP capability? 
                                                 
 2 Paddock, Jr., 17. 
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• What geopolitical conditions and challenges demand the employment of 
strategic PSYOP capability? 
• What were the past efforts to respond to the calls for strategic PSYOP 
capability development? 
Finally, and after examining the previous prompts, this thesis seeks to answer the 
main research question: 
• Why, despite continued recommendations and efforts, has the strategic 
PSYOP capability development failed? 
C. RESEARCH APPROACH AND SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis relies on the qualitative and comparative analysis of historical events, 
and case studies. Due to the exploratory nature of the research project, this thesis provides 
literature reviews as the source of material for discussion. After a thorough examination of 
the materials, this thesis seeks to validate the need for the proposed capability development 
and presents key finding in the form of commentary for observations, rather than 
conclusions for recommendations. 
The first chapter defines the term Strategic PSYOP Capability by referencing 
current doctrine and by analyzing the historical efforts to identify key characteristics of the 
capability. This chapter also examines the strategic effects of the tactical and operational 
PSYOP capabilities in order to delineate the scope of the strategic PSYOP capability. 
Advocating arguments are presented to build the case for the rationales in the discourse of 
the strategic capability development. 
The second chapter examines geopolitical conditions that prompts demand for the 
strategic PSYOP capability development. It examines the conditions during the Reagan 
administration that prompted the strategic response to Soviet global influence activities. 
Efforts to counter the Jihadi propaganda at the turn of the global war on terror (GWOT) 
are examined to identify conditions that created demand for the strategic PSYOP 
capability. Operational environment similarities from the two previous periods of conflicts 
4 
are compared to the current shifting dynamics in the discourse of national strategy, both to 
meet the challenges from the terrorist organizations and the rise of near-peer competition. 
The third chapter analyzes devised efforts to counter the growing threats in the 
information domain. Analyses of PSYOP Master Plans of 1985 and 1990, attempted 
creation of the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), and the interagency efforts to establish 
a degree of strategic responses provide rationales for repeated efforts to counter threats in 
the information domain over decades. 
The culminating fourth chapter identifies and analyzes factors that caused the 
continued efforts to develop a strategic PSYOP capability. Key findings are provided to 
serve as sources to formulate final observations to offer opportunities for a continued 
pursuit of strategic PSYOP capability development. 
D. CURRENT DOCTRINE REVIEW: STRATEGIC APPLICATION OF 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITY 
The keystone publication U.S. Army Psychological Operations, Field Manual 3-53 
Change 1, Military Information Support Operations, describes one of the key PSYOP 
missions’ as its capability utilization in support of commanders, partners, and other 
supported agencies to achieve their desired psychological effects on populations at all 
levels of war.3 It further stipulates that PSYOP forces 
conduct interagency-intergovernmental support in support of non-DOD 
information and public diplomacy efforts to communicate the U.S. 
narrative, and further regional, interagency partner, and country team 
initiatives. Interagency-intergovernmental support leverages regional 
expertise, planning capability, and media knowledge to support non-DOD 
information efforts to convey the U.S. narrative and further regional and 
country team initiatives and strategic communication. Interagency-
intergovernmental support facilitates non-DOD missions that support the 
geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater campaign plan (TCP), 
DSPD, and Department of State (DOS) programs and activities.4 
                                                 
 3 Department of the Army. Military Information Support Operations, FM 3-53, C1 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2013), 
https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=102936. 
 4 Department of the Army, 12. 
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U.S. Army PSYOP fulfills its strategic mission requirements by providing 
interagency-intergovernmental support through military information missions. The three 
distinct PSYOP missions are depicted in the following diagram (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Army MISO Missions.5 
The Joint Publication 3-13.2 Change 1, Military Information Support Operations, 
establishes the scope of the joint PSYOP capability at all levels of war as it supports 
national policy and commanders’ objectives. It also points to the importance of the PSYOP 
role in strategic communications as a key capability that serves to influence foreign 
audiences in support of the U.S. strategic objectives. While discussing the applicability of 
the PSYOP to different levels of war, the joint publication indicates that 
MIS forces normally plan and execute operations in support of operational 
and/or tactical-level headquarters with a defined joint operations area. 
However, MIS forces may support USG departments and agencies, GCCs, 
or multinational partners. This is often the case when supporting a broad 
USG approach designed to achieve strategic objectives. MISO that support 
strategic objectives are often transregional in character and normally 
                                                 
 5 Source: Department of the Army, Military Information Support Operations, 1–3. 
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involve detailed coordination with one or more GCCs and interagency 
partners.6 
In conclusion, current U.S. military doctrine defines the psychological operations 
capabilities as inherently military that conduct operations in support of the commanders 
and interagency efforts to achieve national policy goals at all levels of war and peace. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following subsections identify characteristics of the strategic PSYOP 
capability by exploring historical evolution of the concept. It discusses strategic 
implication of tactical and operational application of the PSYOP capability in order to 
distinguish unique features of the strategic capability from others. Advocating arguments 
for the development and establishment of a strategic PSYOP capability are presented to 
illustrate propositions for the strategic capability development. 
During his address to the British Royal United Service Institution in 1952, Dick 
Crossman, the British pioneer of Psychological Warfare, observed that “by strategic 
propaganda I mean propaganda which is spread to the whole of the enemy nation.”7 His 
assertion was confirmation of the battle proven effectiveness of psychological operations 
during World War II, while offering wide application of its capabilities for the looming 
Cold War. 
The recognition of psychological operations’ relevancy after World War II led to 
the establishment of Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) in 1951. However, significant 
conversations to incorporate psychological operations capabilities into the strategic 
planning process started to take shape in the early 1970s and during the final years of the 
                                                 
 6 Department of Defense, Military Information Support Operations, JP 3-13.2, Change 1 (Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, 2011). 
https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/1C1_JP_3-13-2.pdf. 
 7 William E. Daugherty, “The Creed of a Modern Propaganda,” in A Psychological Warfare 
Casebook, eds. William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Bethesda, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins 
University, 1958), 37. 
7 
Viet Nam War.8 As Raymond J. Barrett, senior advisor of the Department of State to the 
Army’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center observed in his article of 1972, “efforts 
to delineate the concept of psychological operations have been impeded by a reluctance to 
acknowledge PSYOP as an instrument of strategy,” until then, psychological operations 
capabilities were heavily employed in tactical and operational level of war.9 Barrett began 
his investigation on the possibility of expanding the use of PSYOP capabilities beyond the 
traditional employments. He highlights the importance of PSYOP capabilities in the 
context of the national power elements and offers recommendations on how psychological 
operations capabilities can be used to maximize operational outcomes in the context of 
supporting the national strategy.10 
During the same period, in an attempt to highlight the importance of psychological 
effects on war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff defined military operations to, “include 
psychological warfare and, in addition encompass those political, military, economic and 
ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral, friendly foreign groups the 
emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.”11 It 
continued to formulate the “concept of the strategic Psychological Operations as ‘aimed at 
influencing and shaping decision-makers’ power to govern or control their followers.”12 
Barret criticized this definition as too vague and over inclusive and proposed to develop a 
more precise definition and a workable concept. 
The 1984 DOD Directive S-3321.1 directed the authority to conduct overt PSYOP 
in peace time and in contingencies short of declared war to every Unified and Specified 
                                                 
 8 Susan L. Gough, The Evolution of Strategic Influence, (Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania: USAWC 
Strategy Research Project, 2003), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/gough.pdf. 
 9 Raymond J. Barrett, “PSYOP. What Is It? And What We Should Do About It,” in The Art and 
Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application Volume 1, eds. Ronald De 
McLaurin, Carl F. Rosenthal, and Sarah A. Skillings (Washington, DC: American Institute for Research, 
1976) 40–46. 
 10 Barrett, 40–46. 
 11 Barrett, 46. 
 12 Barrett, 46. 
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Commander-in-Chiefs.13 An overt PSYOP was defined as operations coordinated with the 
State Department through each region’s Country Team’s (CT) approval. The United States 
Information Agency (USIA) then would oversee individual programs to prevent 
dissemination of conflicting information. The DOD Directive stipulated that the military 
PSYOP would and should fill information capability vacuum not covered by other 
government agencies, and specifically pertaining to the military operations. 
The 1985 PSYOP Master Plan which followed DOD Directive S-3321.1 and the 
subsequent 1990 PSYOP Master Plan emphasized the role of PSYOP as a “strategic 
instrument of national security policy.”14 They also established psychological operations 
as “an inherent responsibility of military commanders,” and suggested “consideration and 
use of PSYOP in peacetime, crisis, and war.”15 
The report of the Defense Science Board Task Force of 2000 distinguishes inherent 
characteristics among different levels of PSYOP functions. The report characterizes the 
strategic PSYOP capability as 
a permanent PSYOP staff organization under the direction of ASD SO/LIC, 
will work closely with U.S. Department of State Public Diplomacy staff 
members. Their primary purpose, in accordance with Presidential Decision 
Directive 68, will be to assist the Department of State in developing 
strategic International Public information plans and programs. Additionally, 
this strategic PSYOP planning staff will also be able to de-conflict and 
synchronize the Theater CINC’s PSYOP scheme with the strategic 
International Public Information plan. The link between the strategic 
PSYOP planning staff and the theaters will occur through the Joint PSYOP 
Headquarters. For the first time, this headquarters will bring all the military 
PSYOP assets under one organization. Commanded by a flag officer, the 
Joint PSYOP Headquarters will maintain open contracts with civilian 
advertising and marketing firms for assistance in PSYOP product 
development and links with members of academia studying the potential 
                                                 
 13 Department of Defense, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by The Military Services in 
Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War, DOD Directive S-3321.1 (Washington, DC: 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1984), https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/18-M-0802.pdf. 
 14 Department of Defense, DOD PSYOP Master Plan 1985 and DOD PSYOP Master Plan 1990 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1985 and 1990). 
 15 Department of Defense, DOD PSYOP Master Plan 1985 and DOD PSYOP Master Plan 1990. 
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impact of information on the attitudes and behaviors of foreign target 
audiences.16 
This capability definition embraces all aspects of military psychological operations, 
across all spectrum of organizational functions, and in various geopolitical environments 
as depicted in the following diagram (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. The Functioning Scope of PSYOP.17 
While recognizing the growing interoperability and blurring lines of distinction 
between different levels of PSYOP functions, the report aims to provide a workable 
solution for the separate development of a strategic PSYOP capability. It also invokes the 
definition of the strategic PSYOP capability as “having global implications and is planned, 
initiated, and executed at the national level,” as outlined in the Presidential Decision 
Directive 68 (PDD 68). 
The Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, defines 
strategic PSYOP capability as “international information activities conducted by U.S. 
Government (USG) agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in 
                                                 
 16 Department of Defense, The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2000), http://iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/dsb/dsb-psyop.pdf. 
 17 Source: Department of Defense, 9. 
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favor of U.S. goals and objectives during peacetime and in times of conflict.”18 It further 
indicates that “these programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but 
can utilize Department of Defense (DOD) assets.” 19  The following categorization of 
PSYOP clearly separates strategic capability characteristics from other two levels of 
operations (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Categories of Military Psychological Operations.20 
The Joint Publication 3-13.2, Psychological Operations, which replaced JP 3-53 in 
2010 defines strategic PSYOP as a capability developed to support all needed government 
agencies, functioning combatant commands, and partner nations. It further offers 
explanation of the strategic capability as “activities focused on achieving broad U.S. and 
multinational objectives in regions of the globe with diverse audiences.”21 The strategic 
character of “PSYOP forces constitute one DOD capability applied as part of a broader 
                                                 
 18 Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, JP 3-53, (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2003), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/02_psyop-jp-3-53.pdf. 
 19 Department of Defense, ix. 
 20 Source: Department of Defense, I-4. 
 21 Department of Defense, Psychological Operations, Joint Publication 3-13.2, (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2010), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-13-2.pdf. 
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USG approach. PSYOP applied at the strategic level are often transregional in character 
and may involve detailed coordination with one or more GCCs and the interagency.”22 
Others, like Richard B. Davenport, while recognizing the need for more 
coordinated U.S. strategic influence capabilities as repeatedly mentioned in previous 
findings and reports, suggest that PSYOP capabilities lead a Joint Influence Warfare 
Element (JIWE) in “providing the highest level of strategic influence representation at the 
National Security Council (NSC), DOD, and State Departments levels.”23 
1. Strategic Implication of Tactical and Operational PSYOP 
It is difficult to clearly delineate operational characteristics of different levels of 
PSYOP capabilities solely based on effects achieved. For example, the Army established 
several tactical level Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies (MRBC) during World War 
II. These tactical PSYOP teams were attached to frontline combat units to support the 
tactical and operational operations, and later supported theater level strategic needs.24 
Therefore, arguments are made that a tactical or operational PSYOP capability can be used 
to achieve strategic goals as “an individual or adversary leadership also may be a strategic 
PSYOP target.”25 This latter assessment further complicates efforts to define strategic 
PSYOP capability and its subsequent development. 
As William F. Johnston points out in his article, The Art and Science of 
Psychological Operations: case studies of military application, “tactical PSYOP should 
support the achievement of strategic objectives.” 26  And the editors of the research 
                                                 
 22 Department of Defense, I-4. 
 23 Richard B. Davenport, “The Need for an Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force Structure,” 
Joint Force Quarterly, 88, 1st Quarter, (2018), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/1412317/the-
need-for-an-innovative-joint-psychological-warfare-force-structure. 
 24 Susan L. Gough, The Evolution of Strategic Influence, 5. 
 25 Department of Defense, Psychological Operations, I-4. 
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acknowledge the overlapping effects of different levels of operations, they also argue that 
“a basic conceptual difference between communications developed to support long-range 
state interests and those used to support immediate, combat missions are essential.”27 This 
differentiation is one of the key characteristics of the strategic level of psychological 
operations. 28  Consequently, much of the military psychological operations conducted 
during World War II, the Korean War, and the Viet Nam War were operational and tactical 
in nature and narrowly focused its effects in the immediate theater of operations.29 These 
operations were hardly intended to gain a long term effect that supported national strategy 
and objectives. 
Dissemination methods play an important role in determining the operational levels 
of PSYOP. However, a disseminating platform can be used alternatively to gain desired 
effects at different levels of operations. For example, the creation of 1st Radio Broadcasting 
and Leaflet (RB&L) Group at Fort Riley during the Korean War was designed to meet 
strategic needs in the theater, but the same dissemination platform was also used to achieve 
tactical and operational effects on the battle fronts.30 Other dissemination platforms are 
inherent to a specific level of operations, as noted by William E. Daugherty, for example, 
radio can be used both for tactical and strategical purposes. In contrast, media such as 
leaflets can produce other than intended effects due to their potential to inadvertently reach 
beyond the targeted geographical area.31 
A cautious approach is required to select an appropriate method of dissemination 
due to some platforms’ ability to reach beyond the intended target audiences and produce 
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unintended effects. In this regard, the distinction of strategic PSYOP capability from other 
levels of operations is difficult to assess based on a dissemination method’s capability. As 
noted in the Report of Defense Science Board, the distinction between different levels of 
PSYOP is blurred because of the broader audiences’ ability to access instantaneously to 
the dissemination platforms, while the messages are not intended for certain recipients, it 
may be impossible to localize any information campaign.32 
The Joint Publication 3-13.2 Change 1, Military Information Support Operations, 
recognizes these limitations as the understanding for the definition of the strategic PSYOP 
capability evolves. 
Joint MISO support policy and commanders’ objectives from strategic to 
tactical levels. The impact of these operations at one level may have 
significant implications at other levels. Although military leadership and 
local key communicators are examples of TAs engaged at the operational 
and tactical levels that are capable of affecting the accomplishment of a 
strategic objective.33 
Nevertheless, two metrics for the strategic PSYOP capability can be inferred to 
define its inherent characteristics: that the effects of strategic PSYOP capability project 
and support long-term national strategy objectives, and the defining scope of dissemination 
methods matter. These two metrics serve to separate different roles and responsibilities of 
three levels of PSYOP as they are outlined in the publication.34 
2. Advocacy for the Strategic PSYOP Capability Development 
Ideas for the strategic PSYOP capability development were taking shape after the 
end of World War II. Richard H. S. Crossman, also known to his colleagues as Dick 
Crossman was a renowned propagandist during World War II. Many of his works were 
regarded as crucial for the development of the psychological warfare in general, and served 
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as foundation to the American psychological operations during the conflict. 35  In his 
address to the British Royal United Service Institution in 1952, Crossman pointed out that, 
“the psychological warrior must regard himself as a part of the military organization, and 
all that he does must be fitted carefully and meticulously into the over-all strategy of 
war.” 36  During the same address, he also notes that, “to be effective, propaganda 
operations must be related to strategic requirements and prepared where policy and higher 
military strategy are known.”37 
Others, since the years of Crossman, have advocated for the development of a 
strategic PSYOP capability to meet the challenges of changing geopolitical environments, 
especially during the final years of the Cold War. Those efforts resulted in the publication 
of 1985 PSYOP Master Plan and the subsequent revised version in 1990. During those 
active years of strategic PSYOP capability development, COL Richard Brauer and Dr. 
Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., were among the most notable advocates for the proposal.38 They 
both advocated for an expansive role of psychological operations beyond battlefield 
effects. 
Dr. Carnes Lord, in his paper titled The Psychological Dimension in National 
Strategy emphasizes the need for the PSYOP capability integration at the strategic planning 
process. He argues that until the final years of the Cold War, the scope of PSYOP was too 
narrowly focused on battlefield effects, ignoring its potential and critical capacity for 
producing strategic effects when incorporated at national level planning process.39 His 
suggestions resonated with the main proposals outlined in the 1985 and the 1990 PSYOP 
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Master Plans. As he witnessed stalled efforts of capability development and necessary 
structural changes to accommodate the proposals, he concluded that 
the entire area of strategic war planning is of critical importance in this 
context, since it is the point at which the military, diplomatic, and 
psychological-political components of national strategy most closely 
converge. Any effort to enhance and better integrate strategic planning at 
the national level, as recommended by influential voices in Congress and 
elsewhere, needs to focus on the difficult substantive and procedural issues 
involved in war planning. More generally recognized is the need for 
integrated interagency planning in crisis situations; but here as well the 
potential of psychological-political warfare seems not to have been fully 
realized.40 
After the collapse of Soviet Union, debates for a need to develop strategic PSYOP 
capability continued. Few members within the military took the lead in recommending for 
the continued efforts of the strategic PSYOP capability development. In his academic 
work, MAJ Maurice A. Lescault, Jr. argues military PSYOP units should be “used as a true 
strategic asset to achieve national security objectives.”41 He emphasizes the use of PSYOP 
as “one method to harness the true power of information and direct it toward achieving 
U.S. national strategic objectives.”42 
Kathy J. Perry argues that after the successful first Gulf War, the renewed interest 
in Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) prompted acceptance for the justification of use 
of PSYOP as a strategic tool. In her view, PSYOP is the right tool to meet the challenges 
of the changing geopolitical context, while adapting to the technological advancements of 
the coming century. She concludes the use of PSYOP as a strategic information capability 
is the key to achieve support to national security objectives.43 
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The release of the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force in 2000, marked 
the new era for renewed interest in strategic PSYOP capability development. The board 
stresses that the use of PSYOP is better suited for before and after any military conflicts 
since it can favorably shape the context of military actions, serve to amplify deterrence 
mechanisms, and achieve approving public opinion.44 
The shift in focus on national security strategy after the 9/11 brought urgent need 
for the application of the PSYOP for immediate battlefield effects. However, even after the 
short-lived attempt to establish OSI within the Pentagon for better strategic planning 
coordination, the spirit of advocacy for the development of strategic PSYOP capability 
continued.45 
Many who advocated for the development of strategic PSYOP capability during the 
early years of the GWOT formulated their ideas around three topics: capability recognition, 
doctrine review, and permanent staffing. In his monograph, LTC Dave Acevedo points to 
the shifting national security priorities as the main cause of lost interest and recognition of 
PSYOP as strategic tool.46 LTC Christopher L. Leyda argues that while the doctrine 
“identified the need for close theater and interagency coordination, it failed to clearly 
define or explain the procedures for integrating theater strategic PSYOP initiatives and 
activities at the national level.”47 Around the same time, LTC Susan L. Gough identifies 
employing full-time staffs as the key for establishing a robust strategic PSYOP 
capability.48 
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Throughout decades of witnessing the importance of the psychological operations 
in peace time and war, many authors, practitioners, and members of working group 
supported the idea of broader application of PSYOP capabilities, and they continued to 
advocate for the development of strategic enterprise. However, these efforts brought no 
substantial progress to the comprehensive capability utilization since then. 
Recent suggestions retrofitted by Richard B. Davenport in 2018 advocated for the 
establishment of sub-unified influence command in order “to coordinate the proper 
aligning, synchronizing, harmonizing, unifying, integrating, improving, countering, 
collaborating, directing, and de-conflicting of all forms of influence and persuasion efforts 
among all elements of DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic) and 
JIIMs(Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational).”49 As the geopolitical 
environments change and technological advancements happen overnight, the advocacy for 
the strategic PSYOP capability continues on in small circles of practitioners and scholars. 
F. CONCLUSION: CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIC PSYOP 
CAPABILITY 
Several differing definitions and nuanced interpretations make up the literature of 
the strategic PSYOP capability, but the following key characteristics are recognized by 
many as a unique component of the capability. 
• Capability to respond and incorporate into the national strategy dialogue. 
• Capability to influence broader spectrum of audiences. 
• Capability to support planning and execution for various war or peace 
time information campaigns. 
• Capability to interoperate with various intra and interagency departments 
to support planning and execution processes. 
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• Capability to maintain operations for long term effects. 
• Capability to amplify deterrence mechanism pre-conflict and shape the 
information environment during and after the conflict. 
Developing these key characteristics are crucial to meet the challenges of the 
changing geopolitical environment, meet new requirements of technological 
advancements, and adapt to continuously morphing social trends. 
19 
II. THREAT AND CAPABILITY-BASED APPROACH 
DEVELOPMENTS: DEMAND FOR THE STRATEGIC PSYOP 
CAPABILITY 
This chapter examines the underlying characteristics of threat-based and capability-
based approach that guide the development of new capability. It highlights conditions in 
which the demand for the strategic PSYOP capability arise, from the last decade of Cold 
War to recent periods that prompted the need for U.S. strategic countermeasure responses. 
The resulting examination would then serve to compare and contrast similarities between 
the past and the current conditions and highlight the importance of strategic PSYOP 
capability development through the periods of Revolution in Military Affairs after the end 
of Cold War. The objective is to analyze how external conditions and internal innovative 
approaches demand for strategic PSYOP capability development. 
In this chapter, three distinctive geopolitical conditions are analyzed. It starts by 
describing the underlying characteristics of Soviet propaganda during the final decade of 
Cold War that prompted U.S. strategic countermeasures. Next, similar analysis is presented 
on Jihadi propaganda during periods of War on Terror. Subsequently, it will analyze 
characteristics of present information warfare conditions in the context of great power 
competition, particularly those involving Russia and China. 
Finally, this chapter concludes by identifying conditions that prompted the efforts 
to develop strategic responses relying on psychological operations capabilities in defense 
planning. 
A. SOVIET INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES DURING FINAL YEARS OF COLD 
WAR 
Soviets employed a variety of influence activities in support of their foreign policy 
goals, usually through means of tarnishing images of their rivals.50 These activities were 
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categorically placed under three modes: black, grey, and white operations.51 While black 
and grey influence modes fall under the so called Active Measures or covert activities, all 
Soviet Political Influence Activities, to include overt operations, were under the authority 
of Politburo Approved Programs. These influence activities intended to support the Soviet 
policy objectives through close coordination in strategy and tactics as shown in the 
following diagram (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Soviet Active Measures.52 
Various governmental institutions and apparatus were involved in Soviet Active 
Measures and Propaganda. While covert activities were under the oversight of the KGB, 
other less secretive or overt activities were executed through interagency coordination to 
maximize efficiency. 53  These agencies and government outlets used many types of 
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communication platforms, such as radios, magazines, books, and newspapers to 
deliberately disseminate disinformation.54 
Notable Soviet Influence Activities, include disinformation operations and 
forgeries circulated in Africa and in Europe of falsely accusing the U.S. intelligence 
agencies’ plan to overthrow the Angolan, Seychelles, Ghana, and Greek governments in 
the early 1980s. False accusations of the U.S. involvement in the papal assassination 
controversy in 1983 was another high profile disinformation operation by the Soviets in 
early 80’s.55 In his testimony to Congress at the Senate Hearing on Soviet Active Measures 
in 1985, then former Deputy Director of CIA Robert M. Gates said, “Active Measures are 
used to exploit vulnerabilities in West European political life by feeding ideas, guidance, 
and financial support to disaffected elements of the politically active public.”56 Former 
Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger compared the Soviet Active Measures to 
World War II psychological warfare operations.57 
Soviet Influence Activities did not have much of their intended effects on Western 
democracies. Geopolitical conditions of bipolar power structure during the Cold War made 
the Soviet propaganda easily identifiable. The public faith in government institutions was 
high during this period, and the free press in the West created effective filters to scrutinize 
Soviet propaganda activities targeted on wary Western populations.58 However, the effects 
of Soviet disinformation activities in the Third World were substantial. Looser professional 
journalism standards, susceptibility to financial incentives, and politicization of media 
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contributed to the compounding effects of Soviet disinformation operations in the Third 
World nations to antagonize the U.S. and the West.59 
Soviet Influence Activities were heavily focused on Western Europe and America, 
but their strategic reach was truly global.60 From the valleys of Afghanistan to the jungles 
of Panama, and from the farmlands in South East Asia to the modern mega cities in Western 
European countries, the globalized Soviet disinformation operations were actively seeking 
to influence target audiences for the benefit of their status as a world superpower.61 The 
main security threat to the U.S. during the Cold War was evident, and the demand to 
counter such enemy tactics was urgent. The Soviet Politburo emphasized strategic 
influence activities, persisting in their global operations until the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991.62 
B. JIHADI PROPAGANDA IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
At the outset of war on terror after the events of 9/11, a shift in security focus on 
counterterrorism put emphasis on countering violent extremist organizations’ narratives. 
Jihadi propaganda exploitations saw a steady increase in their frequency and impact on 
targeted population as operations for GWOT waged on. Jihadi movements have three 
distinct strategic communication goals: to legitimize their ideology, propagate their cause, 
and intimidate their opponents.63 Successful recruitment efforts and popular support of 
their cause are the direct result of their influence activity. Militant groups’ use of online 
                                                 
 59 Kux, 19. 
 60 Soviet Active Measures Senate Hearing, 98th Cong. (1985) (statement of Robert M. Gates, Deputy 
Director for Intelligence, CIA and James H. Geer, Assistant Director for Intelligence, FBI), 28. 
 61 Herbert Romerstein, “Soviet Active Measures and Propaganda: “New Thinking” and Influence 
Activities in the Gorbachev Era,” 52–53. 
 62 Alexander M. Perkins, Master Thesis, “Soviet Active Measures Reborn for the 21st Century: What 
is to Be Done?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1069692.pdf. 
 63 Steven R. Corman and Jill S. Schiefelbein, Communication and Media Strategy in the Jihadi War of 
Ideas, 0601 (Arizona: Arizona State University, 2006), http://csc.asu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/119.pdf. 
23 
media platforms was nothing new, but their social media networking platforms exploitation 
blossomed at the height of ISIS online influence activities.64 
Jihadists use similar methods and techniques of communication used by many 
institutions and corporations. 65  They individualize messages targeting particular 
demographic groups to increase their chance of successful recruitment. ISIS was known to 
manage a group solely dedicated to online influence activities. About 500 to 2,000 active 
online members formed the online battalion to spread their ideology and recruit new 
fighters.66 Even though online media platforms provide faster and more pervasive access 
to their target audiences, Jihadi groups also use traditional communication methods such 
as magazines. Inspire produced by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Azan by Taliban in 
Pakistan, and Dabiq by ISIS are a few examples of jihadi groups attempts to spread and 
legitimize their ideology by establishing their own communication platforms.67 
The success of jihadi propaganda is evidenced by the number of new ISIS recruits 
around the world as of December 2015. About 30,000 foreign terrorist fighters joined the 
ISIS in Syria coming from at least 85 countries around the world. 68 These previous 
numbers are estimated to have reached around 40,000 in the past five years with almost 
5,000 European citizens within their ranks. 69  The extent to which ISIS operates has 
become global. Their propaganda targets both the sympathizers and perceived enemies 
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alike across transnational boundaries. As depicted in the following schematic 
representation, jihadi propaganda target audiences are categorically labeled and matched 
to their overall narrative plan (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Jihadi Propaganda Plan and Audience Concept.70 
The jihadi propaganda has important strategic implication for the U.S. It requires a 
strategic response that must be focused for long-term effects. As foreign fighters returning 
to their home countries may pose direct risk of increase in domestic terrorism, they also act 
as a reference point of inspiration for those who seek to join their violent cause.71 Ideology 
is hard to eradicate, and as long as there is a susceptible audience and aspiring candidates 
for the jihadist’ cause, it is likely that the fight against their ideology will require a long 
term response. Our enemies’ ubiquitous use of messaging and media at the turn of the new 
millennia developed into a new security threat. What used to be a threat-based capability 
development required a renewed approach. It was no longer who, but where, how and what 
are the methodology used by our enemies that our countermeasures need to be focusing 
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on.72 Global reach of jihadi propaganda will require a strategic counter-response that will 
outlast their malign effects. 
C. CONFLICT OF INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE IN THE ERA OF 
GREAT POWER COMPETITION 
The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in 
sweeping and systematic fashion.73 
—The Mueller Report, March 2019 
 
Almost three decades after the end of Cold War and two decades into the war in 
Afghanistan, the shifting geopolitical environment is felt strongly. The Russian online 
influence operations delivered immeasurable but pervasive damaging effects during the 
2016 presidential election cycle. According to the 2019 Special Counsel’s Report on The 
Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, the Russian 
government sponsored Internet Research Agency intended to “sow discord in the U.S. 
political system through what it termed information warfare.” 74  Through its 
unsophisticated methods of online troll messaging techniques, they targeted unwitting 
American public to spread disinformation.75 While measurable effects of the Russian 
influence activities during the 2016 presidential elections are hard to substantiate, the 
lingering effect on the general population’s attitude toward our political system is 
concerning. For example, research conducted by Ipsos before the 2018 mid-term elections 
showed only half of the U.S. population believed in the fairness of election system.76 A 
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similar poll conducted by NPR/Marist during the same period also revealed that the half of 
the U.S. population did not trust in the fairness of the election system, compared to nearly 
two-third of population that were confident of the voting counts during the 2016 
presidential elections.77 
Russia is not the only near-peer competitor country at the forefront of information 
warfare against the U.S. China is also under the suspicion of using nearly 2 million online 
trolls to shape the information environment favorable to their cause.78 While the Chinese 
influence activity tactics are less hostile toward the U.S. compared to the more assertive 
Russian’s, their operations are damaging to the whole ecosystem of free flow of ideas and 
speeches. The Chinese government’s troll operations are mainly aimed at silencing 
domestic dissents and international critics. In doing so, they intend to divert international 
attention away from their state authoritarian practices. These volunteer trolls are most 
active when the Communist Party’s reputation is compromised, and international scrutiny 
is on them in the news. The Chinese government uses nationalist rhetoric in order to defend 
from criticism of what they see as a danger to their regime’s survival.79 Trolls viciously 
attack, divert, discredit, and disengage from accusations of their critics.80 They intend to 
promote their country’s status as a reliable global partner abroad, rally domestic support, 
and support the communist regime’s foreign policy goals. 
Russia and China resort to online information warfare tactics to dissuade criticism 
and garner international support by attacking other nations critical of their regimes. Other 
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less powerful countries hostile to the U.S. government, such as Iran and Venezuela, are 
teaming up with other more powerful revisionist states to discredit the U.S. geopolitical 
influence around the world.81 
Strategic implication of revisionist states and their partnering states’ information 
warfare activities against the U.S. is significant. Pew Research Center study in December 
of 2016 indicates about 64% of Americans think fake news has left them confused of basic 
facts.82 In a study conducted by Pew Research Center and Elon University’s Imaging the 
Internet Center, over 80% of respondents in technology, academia, corporate, and 
government believed the impact of near-peer competitor states’ ability to sow distrust 
among the American population would either continue to be a major issue or get worse in 
the next decade.83 
Quantifiable effects measurement of the Russian state sponsored troll operations 
and its reach to U.S. voters during 2016 U.S. presidential elections are difficult to compute, 
but its intended effects are visible in our daily interactions with others, on and offline. Our 
shared values are tainted, our tolerance for acceptance of different opinions are thinning, 
and our social division gaps continue to widen. Gaps in our political difference are 
widening without any sign of consensus, and political compromise is a bridge too far to 
cross over. It is the era of political stalemate and dissents. Counter measure capability is in 
demand, whether through threat or capability-based approach analysis. 
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D. CONCLUSION: DEMAND FOR STRATEGIC PSYOP CAPABILITY 
DEVELOPMENT 
Online influence activities could become the standard playbook of our foes to 
undermine U.S. strategic goals. Unsophisticated and spontaneous online troll operations 
offer simplicity and economic advantage over other conventional capabilities. The 
technological advancements give an edge to the bad actors over the fight in the information 
domain for years to come. Threats from the changing geopolitical environment remain as 
the cause for the development of new capabilities to meet the new requirements, as 
witnessed in near-peer competition and the rise of jihadi propaganda. But the progress in 
technology also demands capability-based adaptation to counter the future threats. 
Current Russian influence activities, a proceeding effort of the Soviet Active 
Measures, will remain as a relevant capability of employment by the Russians against the 
U.S. policy goals. It is matter of time before the Chinese online army of millions become 
more proactive and assertive to seriously undermine our democratic process. The threat of 
jihadi propaganda is here to stay for as long as their ideology lingers. Threats and 
capabilities are evolving together, not dissolving. Transformation in defense capabilities is 
an ongoing process that could overextend in time and space but should never cease to 
evolve and continuously adapt to the new environment. 
In the context of information warfare capability development, efforts for the 
strategic PSYOP capability development seem suitable and feasible, as witnessed in the 
past demands for the strategic PSYOP capability development that came close to 
materialization. 
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III. EFFORTS OF STRATEGIC PSYOP CAPABILITY 
DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter explores respective U.S. government’s strategic countermeasures to 
the previously examined hostile state and non-state actors’ influence activities. Demand 
for the strategic PSYOP capability development grew as threats during the final decade of 
the Cold War and in the early years of the war on terror became evident. The need for the 
capability development gained consensus and support among bureaucrats concerned with 
capability innovation to meet the challenges. This chapter aims to provide context in which 
the demand for the capability development led to the efforts of capability innovation. 
It starts by analyzing attempts to develop strategic PSYOP capability during the 
administrations of Presidents Reagan and Bush Sr. The PSYOP Master Plan of 1985 and 
the revised version of 1990 are analyzed in the context of countering Soviet propaganda. 
Next, analysis of the Pentagon’s short-lived Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) during the 
early years of the war on terror will provide an overview of the U.S. government’s attempt 
to establish strategic PSYOP capability in the face of rapidly changing national security 
priorities. Finally, analysis on the evolution of the State Department’s Global Engagement 
Center (GEC), and the interagency integration efforts with the Army PSYOP capabilities 
will underline the importance of the interagency cooperation as part of the strategic PSYOP 
capability development efforts. 
Finally, this chapter will conclude by discussing how the demand for the strategic 
PSYOP capability development proceeded forward with matching efforts that ultimately 
failed to meet its operational requirements. 
A. FINAL YEARS OF THE COLD WAR: PSYOP MASTER PLAN OF 1985 
AND THE REVISED VERSION OF 1990 
The Reagan Doctrine of aggressive military buildup during the last decade of the 
Cold War saw increased DOD expenditure and capability expansion. This renewed policy 
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focus also affected efforts to revitalize PSYOP capabilities.84 Its aim to reinvigorate and 
build capability able to effectively counter the persistent Soviet propaganda came in a 
series of important presidential directives and executive orders. The National Security 
Decision Directives (NSDDs) 45, 77, and 130 provided foundational guidance to build 
effective information capabilities to support the national strategy.85 
After signing of the NSDD 77 in 1983, President Reagan directed the DOD to revise 
PSYOP functions and rebuild its capabilities. The NSDD 130 of 1984 specifically instructs 
the DOD to reinvigorate military PSYOP capabilities and fully reintegrate its functions at 
all levels of planning, during war and peace. Subsequent DOD Directive S-3321.1 outlined 
guidelines to conduct overt Psychological Operations in peacetime to support military 
activities at Unified and Specified command level of operations.86 
After these series of presidential and DOD directives, the 1985 PSYOP Master Plan 
was issued to direct “fundamental improvement of the department’s capabilities to 
effectively perform worldwide Psychological Operations in support of national objectives 
in peace and crisis and at all levels of conflict.”87 Among hundreds of suggested remedial 
actions to improve overall PSYOP capabilities, two innovative and notable but 
controversial proposals supported the idea of development of strategic PSYOP capability: 
the creation of a Joint PSYOP Center (JPOC) capable of conducting operations at all levels 
of conflict, and the separation of PSYOP capabilities from special operations. 
The plan was approved after thorough investigation of existing capability gaps and 
meant to serve as a framework to renew PSYOP capabilities to meet growing challenges 
in a world of superpower competition. It laid fundamental steps to restructure and outlined 
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capability renewal process to be followed over several years.88 The demand was met with 
efforts to materialize the development of the capability. 
In the plan, several actionable points were identified to support the idea for the 
development of strategic PSYOP capabilities that 
• Preferably be subordinated directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 
• Act as the organizational and institutional front for PSYOP within 
DOD. 
• Be located in the National Capital Region. 
• Function as the key element for interagency coordination and 
cooperation. 
• Have representation from Department of State, Intelligence 
Community, U.S. Information Agency, Voice of America, and Board 
for International Broadcasting. 
• Be responsible for long-range strategic PSYOP plans. 
• Be responsible for the planning, coordination, and direction of the DOD 
portion of national PSYOP activities.89 
As the efforts for the revitalization of PSYOP capability were underway over the 
years, developing geopolitical conditions prompted the reexamination of the initial 
proposals made in 1985. The Soviets needed economic and political reform to survive, and 
the new policy of openness and transparency took precedence over military focus. And, 
sensing the political shift in the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration relaxed its 
aggressive rhetoric toward Moscow.90 
Following the publication of the 1985 PSYOP Master Plan and amid dramatic 
changes in geopolitical environment that led to the historic collapse of USSR, the revised 
version of the plan was published in 1990. Many of the key proposals remained the same 
as outlined in the earlier version of 1985, to include the proposal for a permanent joint 
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enterprise. But the controversial proposal for the separation of PSYOP from the Special 
Operations Command was omitted.91 
Even though the development processes for these two subsequent master plans 
failed to provide fundamental material changes needed for the development of a strategic 
PSYOP capability, they nonetheless served to carry forward the discussion for the need of 
capability development in proceeding years. 
B. STRATEGIC USE OF PSYOP CAPABILITY DURING GWOT TO 
PRESENT DAY: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INFLUENCE AND EFFORTS 
WITHIN THE USSOCOM 
The demand for an expansive role of PSYOP capabilities into strategic planning 
and executions gained attention even after the collapse of the USSR and during the years 
after the first Gulf War. Shortly after 9/11, the Department of Defense created OSI led by 
elements of Psychological Operations, to plan, coordinate, and execute influence 
operations targeting Afghans during the invasion. It intended to shape favorable Afghan 
public opinion on American military actions, and counter terrorists’ narratives.92 The 
OSI’s main objectives and proposed functioning were reflections of proposals made in the 
previous government studies and academic findings. 
Although the OSI was technically under the ASD SO/LIC, it directly reported to 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The creators of the office envisioned an 
inclusive intra and interagency focal point for all influence operations and hoped the office 
would become an interagency body. As many suggested during the years preceding the 
GWOT, the OSI was created to fill the void to support the national strategic objectives 
through coordinated influence activities across the intra departmental and interagency 
capabilities.93 However, even before it could contribute any substance for the overall 
achievement of strategic goals, the OSI was dissolved a few months later after it suffered 
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a scandalous media exposure that mischaracterized the OSI’s as the U.S. war propaganda 
machine.94 
Various efforts were made since the dissolution of the OSI to create a functioning 
organization able to address the need for the strategic PSYOP capability. The Joint PSYOP 
Support Element (JPSE) was established in 2004 to address issues pointed out in the 
PSYOP Master Plans but the organization remained under the USSOCOM command and 
did not have the intended strategic functionality beyond the reach of the command. The 
JPSE was renamed as Joint Military Information Support Center (JMISC) in 2009 but was 
disestablished in 2011. The Military Information Support Operations Command (MISOC) 
was established in 2012 following the dissolution of the JMISC. Even though the newly 
formed organization had a vision to revitalize and expand PSYOP missions and roles by 
transforming its capability for global reach, it was unable to formalize strategic capability 
development as it was short-lived and dissolved in 2014.95 
The core concept of MISOC was to develop MISO Global Network in all levels of 
operations with the purpose of becoming an entity capable of conducting strategic level 
planning. It intended to take the lead as the DOD’s forefront agency for inform and 
influence activities (IIA). It identified areas for capability development necessary to 
become a unifying organization where efforts to globalize its IIA capability was at the heart 
of its functional purpose.96 However, MISOC was dissolved following the reorganization 
of USASOC in 2014 with PSYOP Groups split and individual units were assigned to 
various command structures.97 
In 2016, Senator Rob Portman (R-OH) and Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) 
introduced the Countering Information Warfare Act that called for the need to create the 
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Center for Information Analysis and Response (CIAR).98 The bill was later signed by 
President Obama and was included in the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization 
Act. 99  However, this bill was intended to immediately expose and counter foreign 
propaganda and disinformation, rather than to establish long term strategic information 
capabilities.100 
According to Richard B. Davenport, later efforts since the OSI fiasco were too 
narrow in its scope and approach, both in technicality and practicality. While the CIAR 
intended to focus on countering Russian and Chinese influence activities in many 
platforms, the State Department’s initiative to counter jihadi propaganda in the form of 
GEC is primarily focused on online platforms. This separation of efforts based on separate 
threats leads to less incorporated, uncooperative, and unsynchronized operations.101 
C. INTERAGENCY EFFORTS: THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL 
ENGAGEMENT CENTER 
Influence activity efforts and hostile information warfare countermeasures are not 
limited to military operational capabilities; they involve a strategic perspective, and 
therefore it is inherently an interagency process of coordination and synchronization. While 
PSYOP is inherent to military capability, similar efforts such as public diplomacy led by 
the State Department, require coordinated interagency participation to enhance the 
effectiveness of the whole process. In his comments to Dr. Paddock Jr.’ article on Military 
Psychological Operations, Barry Zorthian, “the former director of the Joint United States 
Public Affairs Office of the U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, stresses the 
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importance of integration of military and civilian PSYOP programs and personnel in 
situations of low-intensity or revolutionary conflict.”102 
In response to calls for the development of strategic communications capability 
during the period of intensifying war on terror, the Department of State began to adopt 
necessary actions to develop capabilities for planning, coordinating, and leading strategic 
messaging. In 2007, the State Department set the Counterterrorism Communication Center 
(CTCC) in the Bureau of International Information Program (IIP). Their principal 
objectives were to coordinate interagency messaging and create specific messaging 
mechanism for the Department of State and Defense.103 
The CTCC was later renamed to Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC) in 
2008. Following the 2009 White House report that called for the development of various 
“programs and activities deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended 
audiences, including those implemented by public affairs, public diplomacy, and 
information operations professionals,” the State Department renewed operational focus of 
the GSEC to countermeasures, and renamed it to Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communication (CSCC) in 2010.104 However, even after years of name changes, the 
ultimate goal of these offices remained as “a way of persuading other people to accept 
one’s ideas, policies, or courses of action.”105 The CSCC was finally replaced and renamed 
as Global Engagement Center (GEC) in 2016, without suffering any significant changes in 
their roles and missions. 
This evolution of efforts was intended to lead a whole-of-government approach by 
providing leadership for coordination and execution in influence activities against jihadi 
propaganda, and later to counter hostile state disinformation operations. Although, the 
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demand for interagency capability development was recognized throughout the process, it 
never achieved full integration of interagency efforts. 
Today, the on-going interagency coordination between the GEC and the U.S. Army 
PSYOP community is facilitated through in-residence active duty PSYOP liaison at the 
GEC. The role of the liaison is primarily focused on providing influence activity expertise, 
as well as perform traditional liaison responsibilities to coordinate and synchronize 
interagency messaging efforts. 
D. CONCLUSION: EFFORTS OF STRATEGIC PSYOP CAPABILITY 
DEVELOPMENT 
Demands for the strategic PSYOP capability development took shape since the 
World War II, but the significant efforts to materialize them only registered during the final 
years of Soviet collapse. As geopolitical threats grew, demand for the capability 
development blossomed, but producing meaningful results in response to those demands 
would take multiple attempts. 
It is important to note that, even as the geopolitical environment and national 
security priorities shifted between near-peer competitions to counterterrorism in a 
relatively short period of time, the need and demand for the strategic PSYOP capability 
development remained as part of the capability development priorities; a critical part of the 
last century’s Revolution in Military Affairs. 
But even demands and needs does not automatically translate into the 
materialization and realization of transformative concepts. Actions that require such 
transformation take a long process of bargaining among interest groups, and painstaking 
negotiations in the bureaucratic political environment. As a result, strategic PSYOP 
capability development efforts stalled and ultimately failed. This nature of the development 
process shows that capability development has two distinctive parts. 
• Demands and needs drive innovative efforts, 
• But the process of materialization is a separated endogenous system filled 
with competition for self-interests, ideas and beliefs. 
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In the proceeding chapter, previously discussed cases will be analyzed in light to 
determine the causes that blocked the efforts to advance the demand and need of strategic 
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IV. PERSISTENT ROADBLOCKS TO THE STRATEGIC PSYOP 
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT: INTERESTS AND BELIEFS IN 
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
This chapter identifies and analyzes how interests and beliefs affected many 
attempts to develop a strategic PSYOP capability. Participants and stakeholders in the 
discourse of the capability development acted upon their own interests to maintain primacy 
of their roles and missions, while arguing that the psychological operations is incompatible 
with the U.S. liberal democratic values. 
At first, academic overview of various political theories on the internal bargaining 
processes through differing interests are introduced. Overview includes review of 
organizational structures that affect bureaucratic processes, assessment of how group 
biases impede smooth transition of ideas for optimal policy directions, and analysis of how 
deeply held beliefs ultimately shape the policy execution outcomes in the context of 
bureaucratic politics. Next, the PSYOP Master Plan fiasco is analyzed through the lenses 
of organizational interest within the bureaucratic processes that failed to deliver results for 
the critical capability gap as identified in the presidential and defense guidance. The 
analysis of the OSI fiasco also offers how differing group interests and biases affect the 
policy execution, resulting in another failed attempt to fill the capability gap. Finally, 
effects analysis of the negative connotation of PSYOP provides reasons why ideas and 
beliefs ultimately affect the development of strategic PSYOP capability. 
In conclusion, this chapter aims to identify, analyze, and determine factors that keep 
preventing the creation of strategic PSYOP capability. Its conclusions will serve to provide 
material for final observations in answering the thesis’ main research question. 
A. PREVALENCE OF INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, BIASES, 
AND EFFECTS OF BELIEFS ON POLICY FORMULATION 
Achievement of security policy goals require a whole-of-government coordination, 
and the military power is only one of many parts in the formulation for policy execution. 
“A combination of political, economic, psychological, and military efforts are necessary” 
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to provide support for achievement of national objectives.106 And the central question is 
how to effectively coordinate national interest efforts within “a complex and 
compartmentalized machine,” that involves bureaucratic processes where each 
participants’ interests differ from one another.107 
Graham T. Allison’s analysis on the Kennedy administration’s internal bargaining 
process for policy directions during the Cuban Missile crisis highlights the prominence of 
bureaucratic politics in foreign policy formulation. He argues that the policy outcome in 
response to the imminent Soviet threat was the product of balancing negotiations and 
compromise among differing government entities, especially those surrounding the 
Executive Branch. The dynamics of bargaining interactions among different stakeholders 
result in individual and organizational version of national interest that ultimately shapes 
the national security policy directions.108 
Critical to Allison’s bureaucratic paradigm, Robert J. Art instead suggests that the 
Presidential preferences have an important role, if not a defining role, to shape the direction 
of foreign policies.109 Art also observes the generational mind-sets shared among the top 
executive decision makers were equally important that affect the decision making process. 
He also highlighted the importance of political pressure generated by domestic politics. 
According to Art, the willingness of the Presidents to accommodate certain public and 
political views affects the process of the policy design. 
Others contend that the efficacy of policy design is a direct result of how the 
government is organized. Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Dahl argues that the 
dysfunctional interagency coordination process is the cause of discord among decision 
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makers for unity in policy directions. He compares existing government organizational 
structure to “archaic, vertical stove-pipes,” and argues it limits the ability of different 
government offices of the Executive Branch to coordinate in an inclusive and horizontal 
manner for optimal integration of efforts. 110  He further assesses that in this current 
structure the flow of innovative ideas and the flexibility to rapidly adapt to the changing 
environment is lethargic, slow, and difficult. In addition, he observes that the Executive 
Branch is too busy with day-to-day operations and their focus is on addressing politically 
urgent issues, rather than problems that require politically fragile reform and long-term 
commitment. He finally suggests that the United States Congress is the government branch 
capable of fixing the broken interagency process through their formalizing, enforcing, and 
funding capabilities.111 
Self-interest of government bureaucrats is another crucial aspect of internal 
bargaining process for policy directions. Jongkon Lee asserts government bureaucrats are 
not neutral professionals nor rational actors, but highly political agents.112 His observation 
further stipulates that “agencies possess not only neutral expertise, but also political 
capability to affect their stakeholders’ behaviors by brokering conflicting interests.”113 
Lee’s assertions also conform to the broader proposition of bureaucratic politics theories 
that assumes foreign policies are not the product of “purposeful acts of unified national 
governments.”114 
Others take the role of self-interests in policy formulation to another unit of 
analysis. They argue that participating individual in the discourse of national strategy look 
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for clues of national interests through their shared global images that echoes their political 
opportunities. In this context, individuals explore their own political interests based on the 
reflection of “organizational and presidential interest.” 115  According to Halperin and 
Clapp, government offices compete over primacy of their roles and missions, especially 
when it aligns with their agency’s core activities. This competition for the agency’s 
relevancy produces a set of “behaviors in the pursuit of organizational interest.” 116 
Organizations tend to exaggerate their activities and information reported to senior 
executives to protect their positions. They also compete for missions coveted by others in 
order to gain and maintain their organization’s relevancy. Roles and missions of 
organizations tend to change in times of crisis, so the career officials anticipate any shift in 
policy and its effect on their organization’s future roles and missions. This tendency leads 
organizations to support a particular policy execution over others. Organizational 
autonomy, morale, and budgets are often other factors that also have effects on the 
calculated behavior of organizations.117 
Further, the psychological traits of decision makers and participants in the policy 
design process also define the overall policy direction and execution outcome. According 
to Irving L. Janis, The Groupthink Syndrome, also defined as group biases, is the principal 
cause for policy execution failures. Groups that lack cohesiveness, that are insulated from 
expert information, suffer from lack of tradition for impartial leadership, or lack internal 
norms for methodological application of decision-making process, are likely to suffer the 
groupthink syndrome. These groups display symptoms of overestimation of their morality 
and capability, have closed-mindedness, and are pressured toward uniformity which leads 
to poor performance. Government organizations with these symptoms are more prone to 
make poor decisions and failed executions.118 
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Finally, Goldstein and Keohane suggests ideas and beliefs should also be factors 
considered for policy process analysis, because they are equally important part of the nature 
of human actions. Ideas and beliefs can ultimately have a decisive effect on the policy 
direction even when these ideas are in direct conflict with each participant’s own 
interests.119 That is because the political values of ideas and beliefs in societies tend to be 
constant, persistent, and resistant to the external pressure for change in valuation. 
Therefore, changes in political values of ideas and beliefs occur slowly over time, leading 
to their prominence over interests in policy negotiations. Principled beliefs are types of 
beliefs that consist of normative ideas. Normative ideas are those that stick to individuals 
and guide them to act by distinguishing between what is right and wrong, or moral and 
immoral. 120  For example, the belief that propaganda is morally wrong, because its 
application methods and effects interfere with the democratic process, is one of many 
examples of principled beliefs in the Western societies. 
B. PSYOP MASTER PLAN I AND II FIASCO: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
OVER THE CREATION OF JOINT PSYOP ENTERPRISE AND THE 
SEPARATION OF PSYOP FROM THE SOF COMMUNITY 
As the growing threats of Soviet influence activities prompted the efforts to 
revitalize PSYOP capabilities, the subsequent shifting dynamics between the U.S. and the 
USSR slowed the pace of the execution of many proposals outlined in the initial PSYOP 
Master Plan of 1985. The urgency for the development of strategic PSYOP capability 
dwindled as the U.S. relaxed its aggressive posture in response to the Soviet’s policy shift 
toward socio-economic reforms under Gorbachev leadership. However, two key proposals 
continued to be the main points of contention and were under intense debate. The 
bureaucratic bargaining process involving various interest groups caused the critical delay 
of the execution of the proposals, ultimately resulting in failure.121 
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While the key proposal to create a permanent joint PSYOP enterprise was mainly 
opposed by the Army and joint staffs, the other closely related and perhaps more 
controversial proposal to separate the PSYOP from special operations dragged on for years 
due to the planned creation of a Special Operations Forces (SOF) unified component 
command.122 
The proponents for the creation of a joint enterprise argued that the psychological 
operations was sufficiently important in the context of national strategy, and therefore 
proposed the creation of JPOC capable to research, plan, develop, and coordinate 
employment of strategic PSYOP across all spectrum of war and peace. On the other hand, 
the opposition argued that, since the majority of the military PSYOP capabilities resides 
within the Army, the proposal would require heavy organizational structural changes that 
disproportionately affects the Department of the Army. And that the joint character would 
force an accommodated distribution of command among different military service 
components through command rotations, while the Army committed to providing majority 
of the needed forces.123 The disagreement was buried under the bureaucratic bargaining 
process for several years, and came to an end when the decision was finally made to keep 
the PSYOP under the Congressionally mandated and newly created U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM). 
The proposal for the separation of PSYOP from special operations was 
recommended to leverage development of strategic scope and fully apply its capabilities 
“in times of peace, crisis, and war at all levels.”124 Supporters of the idea argued that 
leaving PSYOP capabilities under the subordination of special operations would “detract 
from recognizing need for overall applicability of PSYOP in times of peace, crisis, and 
war,” and would “contribute to the lack of broader understanding of PSYOP by other 
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component commands.”125 The opponents of the idea argued that the PSYOP community 
would enjoy sponsorship of a unified commander by keeping them under a SOF force 
structure, as well as by being included in FYDP 11 (Future Years Defense Program).126 In 
addition to the organizational benefits, the cultural and language expertise of PSYOP and 
Special Operation forces would mutually benefit from each other while remaining under 
the same command structure.127 Perhaps a more convincing reason was, the opponents to 
the separation argued that if the PSYOP forces were excluded from the special operations 
command, it could complicate the Congressionally mandated plan to establish a four star 
component command. Without sizable active and reserve PSYOP units, it could be more 
difficult to justify the establishment of a much-needed unified component command.128 
The key proponent for these fundamental changes, retired GEN Richard. G. Stilwell 
argued both the creation of a joint enterprise and the separation of PSYOP from special 
operations was fitting for the given geopolitical environment. In his multiple letters to then 
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., General Stilwell reiterated 
the importance of the findings in the initial PSYOP Master Plan of 1985. He emphasized 
the need to execute the proposals of the plan by distinguishing PSYOP capabilities as 
“inherent in the conduct of military activity, at all echelons of command and in all 
environments – steady state, crisis, and war.” 129  At the same time, he criticized the 
characterization of “Psychological Operations are Special Operations.” 130  He argued, 
leaving PSYOP capabilities under Special Operations command would limit extensive use 
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of its capabilities, and would be unable to extend its potential benefits to other force 
functions. 
Even though attempts were made to partially separate PSYOP from Special 
Operations in two unified commands, it never fully materialized department-wide.131 
After years of debates, negotiations, and bargaining, the proposal to fully separate PSYOP 
from special operations was rejected in 1987 with the creation of unified SOF command 
under a four-star general. 132  Meanwhile, the rationale for the creation of JPOC was 
replaced by conditions outlined on the memorandum sent from then, the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy Dr. Fred Iklé to the former Secretary of Defense Weinberger. In its 
memorandum, while recommending keeping PSYOP under Special Operations Command, 
Dr. Iklé also proposes three actions to be taken in order to satisfy strategic operational 
requirements outlined in the initial PSYOP Master Plan.133 
A few years later, a revised version of 1990 PSYOP Master Plan was devised. The 
later plan, while recommending alternate options for separation, repeated its initial 
emphasis on the need for a joint enterprise. But the competition for resource allocation 
within USSOCOM effectively ended the idea to create a joint PSYOP enterprise as outlined 
in both plans.134 
At the heart of this fiasco lay criticism for the fundamental characterization of 
PSYOP capabilities, degree of willingness to embrace new geopolitical reality, and the 
bureaucratic processes that hinder agile adaptation to new operational environments. The 
proposal to create an independent strategic PSYOP organization capable of synchronizing, 
coordinating, directing planning and execution processes will regain its plausibility after a 
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thorough evaluation of the proposal by presenting evidence for the undeniable necessity of 
the capability. But more importantly, it is critical for the advocates of the proposal to be 
capable of navigating a process mired in the web of complex bureaucratic politics.135 
C. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INFLUENCE FIASCO: EFFECTS OF A 
STAKEHOLDER’S INTERESTS OVER POLICY EXECUTION 
After the end of Cold War, efforts to develop strategic PSYOP capability subsided 
and the momentum created by the two previous Master Plans reduced to subtle 
conversations in smaller circles of few interested. The policy shift from superpower 
competition to countering terrorist organizations promptly demanded rapid changes in 
roles and missions of many organizations within the DOD. The renewed security priority 
emphasized the functions of special operations in the global war on terror. 
The use of PSYOP was once more focused on the tactical and operational benefits 
for the combat operations. And along with the emphasis on special operations, the notion 
of Psychological Operations are Special Operations, was recreated and widely accepted. 
However, with the growing international dissatisfaction over the U.S. foreign policies, the 
DOD saw the need to create an organization capable of supporting strategic objectives of 
the new era of military campaigns. The OSI, mainly led by the PSYOP forces was created 
shortly after the 9/11 to deliver strategic messages to specific target audiences, with an aim 
to support Afghanistan war strategic objectives in the long run.136 
But, within few months of its establishment, the OSI was dismantled facing 
allegations that later were proven to be grossly misleading, and in some instances outright 
false. 137 Initial media reports accused the OSI of planning to conduct disinformation 
operations through feeding false information to foreign journalists and targeting foreign 
audiences. Further allegations accused the OSI of the possibility of recycling those 
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manipulated foreign reports for the U.S. domestic consumption.138 The intensity of the 
media hysteria and the public outcry over the false allegations was evidenced by the 
attention it attracted in such short period of time, which put pressure on the Pentagon and 
led to the decision to close down the nascent organization within few months of its 
establishment.139 
Opponents to the OSI argued that the employment of PSYOP capabilities as the 
strategic capability would undermine the credibility of the U.S., expose journalists to 
unnecessary risks, and taint the liberal democratic values that the U.S. upholds and seeks 
to defend.140 Some even argued that the employment of PSYOP or similar activities were 
outright inappropriate for any use in DOD and in other government agencies, because it 
either contradicted the U.S. national identity or had potential for a perception management 
disaster.141 Others suggested instead, to maximize the use of public affairs over other IO 
capabilities or PSYOP when dealing with strategic communications.142 
The OSI fiasco originated through the controversial media leakage from the 
Defense Public Affairs (DPA) community at the Pentagon.143 They worried the pervasive 
OSI’s influence activities targeting the general public would damage their credibility, and 
at the same time diminish their roles and mission as the main information outlet for the 
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Pentagon.144 Accusers characterized planned OSI activities to persuade and “influence 
public opinion abroad in support of the national interest as Orwellian and 
undemocratic.”145 Sensing the severity of the damage inflicted to the new organization, 
the DOD chose to close it down instead of publicly arguing the office’s existential benefit 
to the national interest, and failed to conduct a thorough investigation to correct possible 
security violations on media leaks.146 
Investigations following the post-OSI fiasco found the accusations against the 
office unsubstantiated. 147  After the findings, some labeled those false allegations as 
motivated by “petty jealousies,” “bureaucratic rivalries,” and even called it “political 
subversion” by the DPA.148 Dr. Carnes Lord declared that the fiasco is viewed as one of 
the most serious impediment to the DOD’s effective plan for developing coordinated 
strategic communications capabilities and functions during the war in Afghanistan.149 As 
result of the intra-agency competition, the tensions between the Public Affairs and the 
Psychological Operations have continued to exist since then.150 
The OSI fiasco underlines the impact of organizational interest on policy execution. 
The effort to develop strategic PSYOP capability was once more diluted by the combined 
complex web of bureaucratic politics and organizational interest. Interest of few, whether 
in support of national interest, played a significant role to setback decades of efforts to 
develop strategic PSYOP capability. But, beneath the two consecutive fiascos lies a 
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fundamental cause that makes the development of strategic PSYOP capability even more 
challenging. 
D. PSYOP: THE NEGATIVE CONNOTATION OF THE BRAND 
The closure of the USIA in 1999 was in part motivated by the U.S. government’s 
effort to dissociate itself from its activities being branded as propagandistic.151 According 
to Scot Macdonald, the American public generally associates psychological operations to 
propaganda, and they view them as “dirty, underhanded, and unfair.”152 Some scholars 
argue that the psychological operations’ close association to the German originated 
technical term of psychological warfare or Weltanschauungskrieg—worldview warfare—
during World War II gave the brand a bad name and persisting negative perception.153 
This negative association of the brand is so pervasive, that according to the retired COL 
Curtis Boyd, even recognizing existing strategic capability of PSYOP is challenging 
because as he puts it, “no senior government official will ever admit that they conduct 
propaganda.”154 
For many, PSYOP is an “un-American weapon”155 and is closely associated with 
fascism and communism.156 The former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates recognized 
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this uncomfortable reality. In his memorandum of 2010 in support of rebranding of PSYOP 
to MISO, he noted that, “although PSYOP activities rely on truthful information, credibly 
conveyed, the term PSYOP tends to connote propaganda, brainwashing, manipulation, and 
deceit.”157 
However, critics point out to the paradox of the public and politicians’ apparent 
tolerance toward the use of more destructive actions and weapons in comparison to 
seemingly benign use of information as a weapon of choice.158 The weaponization of 
information, or the use of PSYOP capabilities during the peacetime or low intensity 
conflicts are perceived to be even more prohibiting. The American public worries about 
the indiscriminate damaging effect of PSYOP to broader audience, in many cases far 
greater than any kinetic actions.159 
In contrast, the employment of PSYOP in tactical and operational level of 
operations, especially during armed conflicts, are more accepted because their damaging 
effects are seen to be kept on a limited unit and/or confined in a specific space. 
Consequently, it is widely accepted that the nature of war gives some latitude in the 
application of actions or use of weapons that gives an edge over the enemy. Strategic 
application of PSYOP is intended to reach a broader target audience in all spectrum of 
warfare, and in peacetime. It seeks to be incorporated into the discourse of national 
strategy, to provide expertise on influence and persuasion, and be able to execute programs 
and activities through its own assets. Its effect is far-reaching, immeasurable, and therefore, 
threatening to the general public. 
Democratic ideas and beliefs of personal freedom are the moral and ethical 
foundation of American society and they serve to guide policy directions. They play an 
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important role during capability development processes and within bureaucratic politics 
that ultimately affect political interests of all participants. In this context, the close 
association of psychological operations to the negative connotation of propaganda and 
government control greatly affects efforts to develop strategic PSYOP capability. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Participants and stakeholders involved in policy execution formulations have 
differing personal, and organizational interests. They are involved in a bargaining process 
where rational political agents support, argue, and disagree with the path of each policy 
formulation. These political agents meticulously calculate their gains and losses on every 
step of the process, by delaying, blocking, or disregarding rational choices that support 
national interest. Group dynamics created by narrowly focusing on shared interests and 
ideas may lead to form biases that ultimately makes a coordinated interagency process even 
more difficult. Ideas and beliefs of individuals and groups also play an important role in 
the process of the policy formulation. The whole bureaucratic process purportedly aims at 
reaching a policy that markedly supports the national interest. But what may seem rational 
choices suffer disagreements and delays once in the process of bureaucratic politics. 
PSYOP Master Plan I and II fiascos of the late Cold War era, as well as the short 
lived Office of Strategic Influence during early years of GWOT portray how interests, 
beliefs, and biases of individuals and groups affected the outcome of policy formulation 
and execution. Many failed attempts to develop a strategic PSYOP capability on every turn 
of the geopolitical dynamics since the late 1980s are the result of persistent roadblocks that 
are composed of differing interests, shared beliefs, and biases of various stakeholders 
participating in the process of bureaucratic politics. 
If we were to accept the need for the development of strategic PSYOP capability in 
the midst of the current challenges, then the pertinent question is no longer to the whys of 
failed attempts for the development of strategic PSYOP capability, but to the prominent 
steps of what and how for the development of the new capability. What is necessary to 
support the materialization of the long overdue capability development and utilization? 
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How are we going to create a mechanism to support the development of strategic PSYOP 
capability without interfering with our values of principled beliefs? 
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V. FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
Overcoming almost four decades of obstacles put forth for the development of a 
strategic PSYOP capability probably will require, not only the conditions that favor for 
such capability development, but also a bargaining expertise that can navigate the web of 
bureaucratic processes. More importantly, efforts to overcome the negative perception of 
the brand will require no small amount of time and may not be able to attenuate its negative 
effects completely in any meaningful timeline. 
For these reasons, I offer to provide few final observations rather than draw any 
plan of action or make confident suggestions. My thoughts are the reflections of what I was 
able to capture so far. I will leave efforts to devise any feasible plan for actions to the 
bureaucrats in the process of policy execution. 
A. AFTERMATH OF THE FIASCOS: FAILED AFGHANISTAN WAR 
NARRATIVE EFFORTS 
High government offices are reluctant to act on the idea of developing strategic 
PSYOP capability due to opposing arguments pointing to the redundancy of capability 
utilization, confusion in roles and missions, but most importantly because of the negative 
perception and association of PSYOP to propaganda. Former Admiral Michael Mullen 
believed the military spoke more through its actions than words. And he wanted the 
“traditional public affairs to provide information and context for military actions.”160 
Many in the Pentagon believed the creation of offices and staffs dedicated to the strategic 
communications only duplicated efforts led by the traditional public affairs. This reasoning, 
amid failed efforts, scandals, and persistent bureaucracies to develop strategic PSYOP 
capability, led to the official change of the term strategic communications to 
                                                 




communication synchronization.161 Since then, PSYOP occupies minimal presence in the 
conversation for the formulation of national strategic narratives. 
As witnessed during the still on-going war in Afghanistan, providing information 
and context of military actions alone may not be enough to decisively dominate the 
information domain and support our war efforts. Almost two decades after the war in 
Afghanistan, the majority of Afghans know very little about 9/11 and why Americans are 
in their country.162 In the absence of convincing American war narrative, Afghans started 
to believe that America is there to conquer them, like the Soviets did in 1979.163 And in 
the absence of the information capability that is capable of delivering convincing and 
persuasive narratives through fitting platforms, our enemies fill the vacuum with their own 
version of war narratives.164 
Actions speak louder than words, for sure, and in some instances fewer words may 
be enough to explain reasoning for our foreign policy to the world. But that mechanism 
alone leaves too many unfilled information gaps that others may be tempted to take 
advantage for their own interests. In addition, our anticipated targeted audiences often have 
their own worldviews, ideas and beliefs based on their long tradition and culture. Messages 
simply narrating why America approaches its foreign policies in certain ways, do not 
necessarily resonate with their own ideas and beliefs. Stories need to resonate with their 
own grievances and offer alternatives that ideally involves American intervention. While 
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America advances its foreign policy objectives, the subject population need to embrace the 
urgency for our actions and make sense of why America does things in the way it does. 
B. OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES: IDEAS AND BELIEF IN 
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
As witnessed in previous chapters, changes in valuation of ideas and beliefs are 
slow and difficult to occur. The idea that the psychological operations is propaganda, and 
therefore it is dirty and unfair, will be difficult to overcome which involves acceptances 
from many bureaucrats and society at large over time. Simply changing the name of the 
brand would not help, because it never changes the core functionality of the capability nor 
the essence of the roles and missions the PSYOP occupies in our military capability. Simple 
changes in use of terminology will not change the ideological effect of the brand.165 
Instead, recognizing the core functions of the psychological operations as essential 
part of the military conduct and the employment of transparent transactions during the 
course of planning and execution could at least help to alleviate the suspicions of many 
that believe PSYOP is part of the evil magic behind government control. 
Underlining the unique operational capability of psychological operations could 
help many bureaucrats begin to appreciate the benefits of PSYOP in the face of growing 
challenges of adversary information warfare activities. Small steps of PSYOP capability 
utilization in assessment, identification, analysis of current environment, vulnerabilities, 
and future opportunities may also help to lessen the hyperbole reaction of many bureaucrats 
and stakeholders against the negative connotation of the brand. 
C. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS CAPABILITY 
As noted by Dr. Paddock Jr., military PSYOP units engage in two broad categories 
of activity: research and analysis, and operations. He explains that 
the first activity consists of continuous monitoring and assessing of the 
psychological environment in specific foreign nations to determine how 
their environment affects the formulation and execution of U.S. policies and 
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actions. This research and analysis results in the publication of unique 
studies and assessments. These studies and assessments provide the 
foundation for establishment of psychological objectives to support U.S. 
goals as they relate to foreign nations or groups. Research and analysis is 
therefore essential to the accomplishment of the second broad category of 
activity, namely, the planning and executing of specific psychological 
operations campaigns, which employ communications media and other 
techniques to cause selected foreign groups and individuals to behave in 
ways that support U.S. national and military objectives.166 
PSYOP can offer its research and analysis capability as it pertains to the design of 
strategic narratives and personalized stories. This capability, a regional expertise, is 
inherent to PSYOP units even after the PSYOP officer career specialty suffered 
organizational separation from the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) specialty. The deriving of 
products from the research and analysis capability is beyond comparable to the traditional 
intelligence reports. It seeks to identify target population’s motivations, traditions, their 
ideas and beliefs, how they think of themselves in relations to the rest of the world, how 
they perceive America, and more importantly, it identifies their grievances, weaknesses, 
and needs. These findings could then be applied over the intended strategic narratives and 
be used for material design of messages, messages that hit the core motivations of the target 
population and return favorable reactions for building positive perception on American 
presence. 
In addition, research and analysis capability utilization is benign and it relates less 
to the negative connotation of PSYOP in general. The American general public’s aversion 
on PSYOP mainly stems from the actions taken by operations capability, which are the 
most visible part of the overall functions of PSYOP. The focus on the use of a research and 
analysis capability could be viewed as a less intimidating and more acceptable step for the 
strategic PSYOP capability development process. 
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D. PERMANENT STAFF PRESENCE FOR THE JOINT STRATEGIC PSYOP 
ENTERPRISE 
Disagreements are hard to bridge without a process that levels off stakeholders’ 
differences. Capability development, a pragmatic necessity, is also a process that takes 
place through political negotiations, bargaining positions, and interest adjustments. As the 
proposal for the creation of a joint enterprise was met with persisting opposition in the past, 
similar reactions from the opposition are expected in the future discourses. 
When the Army PSYOP suffered the separation of the Reserve and Active 
Components under two different command structures in 2006, many considered this to be 
the final nail in the coffin for the efforts to develop strategic PSYOP capability. Advocates 
and opponents exchanged arguments that turned the process into a long journey of 
bureaucratic politics. Bureaucrats argued for the practicality and benefits of the proposal 
from the organizational structural change standpoint, but the strategic PSYOP capability 
development was never part of the conversation. And the so called “divorce of U.S. Army 
Reserve and Active Component PSYOP units” worsened the prospect for any coordination 
for management of capability, talents, and operations.167 As both components support 
different force structures, coordination and integration of efforts during theater operations 
is difficult. The situation is exacerbated with unbalanced capability gap between the two 
components. For this reason, capacity bridging of the two separated components should be 
one of the priorities before resuming any coordinated efforts to develop strategic PSYOP 
capability. 
Dr. Paddock Jr. also suggests capability integration of these two PSYOP 
components may be necessary before any proposal to devise a coordinated, and well-
integrated strategic PSYOP capability is possible. Permanent staffing for a strategic 
PSYOP capability could be done on a rotational basis between the two components, and 
eventually establish a PSYOP center that manages such integration of efforts, capabilities, 
and coordination. 
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E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
A big part of the causes for the failure to develop a strategic PSYOP capability is 
attributed to the historical negative perception of psychological operations as propaganda. 
The idea that the PSYOP is dirty is something no senior officials is willing to be associated 
with. And as witnessed throughout the history of the development process, it is predictable 
that the stakeholders and participants in the process compete for their own organizational 
interests in order to maintain the primacy of their roles and missions. The path for the 
strategic PSYOP capability development is filled with many roadblocks, but the need for 
such demanded capability remains significant in the changing geopolitical environment. 
This research project intended to dissect intricacies revolving around the barriers to 
the proposed application of Psychological Operations capabilities in support of strategic 
level operations. The efforts for revitalization of PSYOP capabilities during the 1980s were 
inspired by the threat perceived in the competition with the Soviets.168 If the challenges 
from the geopolitical competition were the cause of that initial conversation, it is 
conceivable to suggest to revive that conversation in the current era of changing 
geopolitical environment of great power competition. 
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